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The influence of zealots on the noisy voter model is studied theoretically and numerically at the
mean–field level. The noisy voter model is a modification of the voter model that includes a second
mechanism for transitions between states: apart from the original herding processes, voters may
change their states because of an intrinsic, noisy in origin source. By increasing the importance of
the noise with respect to the herding, the system exhibits a finite–size phase transition from a quasi-
consensus state, where most of the voters share the same opinion, to a one with coexistence. Upon
introducing some zealots, or voters with fixed opinion, the latter scenario may change significantly.
We unveil the new situations by carrying out a systematic numerical and analytical study of a fully
connected network for voters, but allowing different voters to be directly influenced by different
zealots. We show that this general system is equivalent to a system of voters without zealots, but
with heterogeneous values of their parameters characterizing herding and noisy dynamics. We find
excellent agreement between our analytical and numerical results. Noise and herding/zealotry acting
together in the voter model yields not a trivial mixture of the scenarios with the two mechanisms
acting alone: it represents a situation where the global–local (noise–herding) competitions is coupled
to a symmetry breaking (zealots). In general, the zealotry enhances the effective noise of the system,
which may destroy the original quasi–consensus state, and can introduce a bias towards the opinion
of the majority of zealots, hence breaking the symmetry of the system and giving rise to new
phases. In the most general case we find two different transitions: a discontinuous transition form
an asymmetric bimodal phase to an extreme asymmetric phase and a second continuous transition
from the extreme asymmetric phase to an asymmetric unimodal phase.
I. INTRODUCTION
The voter model is a paradigmatic non-equilibrium sys-
tem that has been used, amongst other applications, to
study the evolution to consensus in a population [1–5].
In the model, a set of connected individuals or agents,
known generically as voters, can switch between two
opinion states by copying the state of a randomly cho-
sen neighbor. In the simplest, mean–field, formulation
all agents are identical and connected to all others, in
such a way that a voter supporting a particular value of
the opinion can change it with a rate proportional to the
fraction of agents holding the opposite one, the propor-
tionality constant named as the herding parameter, h.
If the system is finite, the model exhibits a competition
that, after a transient time, ends up in the absorbing
state of global consensus where all agents hold exactly
the same opinion and no further evolution is possible.
This picture may change when the model is modified in
order to account for more realistic situations. Among all
modifications studied in the literature, we consider het-
erogeneity and noise. For other aspects which are usually
accounted for by an statistical physics approach to social
dynamics see [6].
Heterogeneity appears, for example, when individuals
differ by their intrinsic rates of change between states, an
extreme case being that of a zealot, an agent that never
changes his state. Another source of heterogeneity arises
when some agents are able to copy only a subset of the
whole population, a situation naturally described by a
graph or network of interactions [7]. Previous work has
focused on the effect that a few zealots might have on the
asymptotic states for regular networks or all-to-all inter-
actions [8–11] and, more recently for complex networks
[10–13]. In these cases, the existence of zealots changes
drastically the evolution of the system: if only one zealot
is present, the system approaches much faster one absorb-
ing state, the state of consensus that corresponds to the
zealot; for equal number of zealots of different opinions,
the system reaches a dynamically active non-consensus
steady state. The presence of zealots in nonlinear voter
models has been shown to result in a rich phenomenology
[14–16]. See also [17–28] for recent papers addressing the
influence of zealots or other agents whose opinions have
a special weight in the dynamical rules on a variety of
models of cooperation and opinion dynamics, and in the
influence of zealots in spatial rock-paper-scissors game
[29]. Zealots are frequently considered also in the realm
of evolutionary games and research concerning the evo-
lution of cooperation, as reviewed recently in [6].
Noise has been included in the voter model as an in-
trinsic tendency to spontaneous changes of state. In the
so–called noisy voter [30] or Kirman model for financial
markets [31–35] the rate at which one voter changes opin-
ion includes, besides the dependence on the fraction of
neighbors in the opposite state, an intrinsic constant or
noise parameter, a. This way of introducing noise can be
easily adapted to different models of opinion dynamics,
such as [36–39]. In any case, the main effect of noise is
that there are no absorbing states so that it prevents the
system from reaching the full consensus states. Moreover,
by increasing the ratio a/h of the noise to the herding pa-
rameter the system undergoes at a critical value (a/h)c a
finite-size transition from a bimodal phase (where agents
2spend most of the time close to one consensus states and
then switching to the other consensus) to a unimodal
one (where there is coexistence of two macroscopic sub-
populations at different states) [40, 41]. The presence
of a complex network seems not to change this general
picture, while the critical value (a/h)c is modified. Few
studies consider agents heterogeneity in the context of
the noisy voter model, see [42] as an exception, nor the
influence of zealots.
In this work, we analyze the effects of zealotry on the
noisy voter model, focusing on the steady–state prop-
erties, and provide a deep relation between this system
and a system made of heterogeneous voters. We restrict
our study to the simplest case of all–to–all or mean–field
interaction, since it represents a suitable and simple sce-
nario where the competition of global (noise) and local
(herding/zealotry) mechanisms is coupled to a symmetry
breaking induced by zealots, which can also be global or
local. Apart from the latter general and physical motiva-
tion, we aim at understanding the role played by zealots
on a population of agents whose dynamics accounts for
two important processes, namely copying or herding and
intrinsic noise. More specifically, we want to describe,
quantify, and understand the changes induced on the dif-
ferent phases of the noisy voter model. In this way, the
present study is a natural extension of previous works
on opinion dynamics of voters [43], the zealots represent-
ing now leaders or inflexible voters, for instance. We
sustain our study on two complementary approaches: a
theoretical one, based on a master–equation description,
and a numerical one. For all the cases studied, the two
approaches compare almost perfectly.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we intro-
duce the stochastic model of homogeneous noisy voters
with different subgroups or communities affected by a
different number of zealots. By an appropriate redefini-
tion of the constants, we show that the model describes
a set of heterogeneous noisy voters without zealotry, the
effect of zealots being accounted for in the new rate con-
stants. Sec. III considers the simplest situation of one
single community, and corresponds to a global influence
of zealots since all individuals are equally influenced. The
latter abstract scenario can be shown as an homogeneous
population of voters equally affected by one or several
leaders. Despite its simplicity, this case turns out to be
important because it is tractable analytically. Moreover,
it provides available information for the study of more
general cases, in particular the two community case con-
sidered in Sec. IV. This two-community case, seen now
as different leaders acting on two different subset of an
homogeneous population of voters, is the minimal situ-
ation where the system can exhibit all possible phases,
and a suitable context to compare the approximate the-
ories, discussed in Sec. IV, Sec. V, and Appendix C,
against the numerical simulations. That way the theory
is constructed going from simple and concrete cases to
general ones, gaining step by step understanding. Two
complementary theories are provided in this work. One
more general but approximated, based on the analysis of
the master equation, given in Sec. V; and another one
which is exact but restricted to the case of one commu-
nity, at Appendix C. Finally, Sec. VI is devoted to the
discussion and conclusions.
II. MODEL
We consider N agents, each one capable to be in one
of two possible states. Following the original applica-
tion to financial markets by Kirman [31], we name those
states as “optimistic” and “pessimistic” but in this work
we do not give any particular meaning to the states of
the agents. The system is divided into M subsystems
or communities so that community k has Nk agents, nk
of them being optimistic at a given moment, under the
influence of z+k optimistic and z
−
k pessimistic zealots, as
schematically represented in Fig. 1. We stress, however,
that each agent interacts with any other agent, irrespec-
tively of the community they belong to.
N1 a hz
+
1 z
−
1
Nk a hz
+
k z
−
k
NM a hz
+
M z
−
M
FIG. 1. Schematic representation of the system made of
agents having the same constants a and h but divided into
M communities with different sets of voters directly influ-
enced by different zealots. The same color of circles (commu-
nities) indicates common constants, a community being fully
characterized by the number of optimistic (green–left square)
and pessimistic (red–right square) zealots linked to it. For an
alternative representation showing the fine structure of one
zoomed community see Fig.4.
Since all agents are identical inside their communi-
ties, the state of the system is specified by the set
S = {n1, . . . , nM} of the number of optimistic agents
of each subsystem. The dynamics or time evolution of S
3is given by a stochastic process characterized by the rates
pi+k and pi
−
k for transitions nk → nk+1 and nk → nk− 1,
respectively:
pi+k =
(
a+ h
n+ z+k
N + zk
)
(Nk − nk),
pi−k =
(
a+ h
N − n+ z−k
N + zk
)
nk,
(1)
where zk = z
+
k + z
−
k is the total number of zealots of
community k and n =
∑
k nk is the total number of opti-
mistic agents. Observe that the interaction among agents
and among agents and zealots is different. While the for-
mer involves all possible pairs of agents, regardless the
community they belong to, the latter distinguishes be-
tween communities. As described in the introduction,
the rates have two contributions: the one encoded by the
noise constant a ≥ 0 is such that a voter changes his
opinion randomly regardless the opinions of other voters
or zealots; the contribution encoded by the herding con-
stant h ≥ 0 represents the random copying mechanism
whose rate is proportional to the total number of vot-
ers with opposite opinion in the whole system, plus the
number of zealots with different opinion within the same
community. We recover the usual noisy voter model if
zk = 0, and the voter model if, in addition, a = 0.
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FIG. 2. Simulation results for the trajectory x(t) and proba-
bility function P (x) of a system ofN = 200 agents, N1 = N/2,
z+1 = z
−
1 = 1, and z2 = 0 for a/h≪ (a/h)c (plots on the top),
a/h = (a/h)c (center), and a/h ≫ (a/h)c (bottom). Time is
measured in units of h−1. The lines on the plots of P (x) are
the reconstruction of the probabilities using K = 4 moments
as explained in Appendix B.
From a mesoscopic point of view, the system is char-
acterized by the probability p(S) of the system being in
a state S. The master equation for p(S), and its cor-
responding moments, are easily obtained from rates (1)
or (2). As discussed in the Appendix A, the equations
for the dynamical evolution of the moments of a given
order involve only moments of lower order and, hence,
are closed. For the usual noisy voter or Kirman model
(with no zealots) the analysis of the stochastic system
proves that there is a finite size phase transition charac-
terized by a qualitative change of the steady-state prob-
ability distribution P (x) of observing a “magnetization”
x = 2 n
N
− 1. Fig. 2 shows typical trajectories x(t) and
their respective steady probability functions P (x). As it
is apparent from this figure, the system may exhibit two
phases separated by a critical value (a/h)c = 1/N . For
a/h ≤ (a/h)c the system is in the symmetrical bimodal
(SB) phase where voters share the same opinion most of
the time, having the two opinions the same overall prob-
abilities in the long run, hence a typical trajectory has
long stays with extreme values of the magnetization and
short transitions among them, while the steady probabil-
ity function P (x) accumulates around the extremes and
becomes bimodal with symmetric maxima at xm = ±1.
For a/h ≥ (a/h)c the system is in the symmetric uni-
modal (SU) phase where probabilities accumulate around
xm = 0, corresponding to a coexistence of opinions. In
the border case a/h = (a/h)c the probability function
P (x) is uniform in the x ∈ [−1, 1] space, meaning that
any fraction of optimistic voters are equally probable. See
also plot (a) of Fig. 5. It is our objective in this paper to
investigate the effect that the presence of zealots and the
splitting in communities has on the unimodal-bimodal
transition.
It is worth writing the rates of Eq. (1) as
pi+k =
(
a+k + hk
n
N
)
(Nk − nk),
pi−k =
(
a−k + hk
N − n
N
)
nk,
(2)
with
a±k ≡ a+
zk
2N
hk ±
∆zk
2N
hk, ∆zk ≡ z
+
k − z
−
k
hk ≡
N
N + zk
h, .
(3)
In this way we show that the system of N identical noisy
voters (same a and h), under the influence of zealots, is
equivalent to N noisy voters without any zealotry influ-
ence but with some heterogeneity in the noise and herd-
ing constants, see Fig. 3. If ∆zk 6= 0, the original noise
parameter a splits in two: a+k for pessimistic to optimistic
transitions, and a−k for the optimistic to pessimistic ones,
that is, inducing a bias in between the two states. On
the contrary, the herding parameter is not affected in this
sense, being the same for both transitions. In all cases,
the mean noise parameter (a+k +a
−
k )/2 increases with the
total number of zealots acting on community k, while the
herding parameter hk decreases.
4NM aM hM
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FIG. 3. Schematic representation of the system where no
zealots is present but different communities have different con-
stants (colors–positions).
III. GLOBAL INFLUENCE
In this section we consider a single community,M = 1,
under a global influence of zealots. It is convenient to dis-
tinguish between balanced (equal number of pessimistic
and optimistic zealots) and unbalanced cases.
A. Balanced case
Consider a situation like in Fig. 4, with one commu-
nity M = 1 and the same number of optimistic and pes-
simistic zealots z+ = z− = z/2.
From Eq. (2), we obtain that the system behaves like
a noisy voter model without zealots with effective noise
and herding parameters
ab = a+
z
2(N + z)
h,
hb =
N
N + z
h,
(4)
where ab increases with z, while hb decreases (the sub-
script “b” refers to the balanced case). That is to say, the
net effect of zealotry is to enhance the original noise by
increasing ab/hb.
The functional form of the new constants at Eq. (4)
are easily understood if we look at the dynamics at the
agent level. The factor in hb is a direct consequence of
removing the zealots from the system in the interpreta-
tion of Eq. (4): an agent now can copy the opinion of
N − nn
z+ z−
FIG. 4. Schematic representation of the state of a system
at a given time with one community of optimistic (green–left
circles) and pessimistic (red–right circles) agents, influenced
by z+ optimistic (green–left square) and z− (red–right square)
pessimistic zealots.
only N agents, while initially there where N + z agents
and zealots. The noise term accounts for the removal
of zealots. The additional contribution to ab is essen-
tially the rate at which one zealot was initially copied
divided by two. The division by two is required since a
couple of opposite zealots forms a unit of uncertainty, or
equivalently because only half of the zealots contribute
to either one of the two possible transitions. This picture
clarifies the deep connection between the voter and the
noisy voter model, in the sense that the latter can be un-
derstood as the former with the additional influence of
couples of opposite zealots.
As for the noisy voter model, the border case separat-
ing symmetric bimodal and symmetric unimodal is given
by the condition ab/hb = 1/N , that using Eq. (4) reads
(a/h)c =
2− z
2(N + z)
. (5)
Since we are considering z ≥ 2 (remember that for the
present case z is an even number), the critical value given
by Eq. (5) is zero or negative. That means that for
z+ = z− ≥ 1 the system only shows the symmetric uni-
modal phase. In other words, zealotry always destroys
the symmetric bimodal phase, a result that also holds
for a = 0, the noiseless voter model, see plot (b) of Eq. 5.
We realize now how sensitive is the system to the global
influence of zealots: not only the absorbing or consensus
states at x = ±1 disappear, but the most probable config-
uration of the system becomes one where equal fractions
of agents with different opinions coexist. The dramatic
change in passing from z = 0 to z = 2 is due to the global
influence of zealots, and will be relaxed in Sec. IV, upon
considering partial influence with two communities.
Concerning xm, the location of the maxima of P (x), we
obtain |xm| = 1 if ab/hb < 1/N and xm = 0 if ab/hb >
1/N , provided z = 0; while it is xm = 0 for z ≥ 2.
As depicted in Fig. 5, xm experiences a discontinuous
5transition at the critical point Eq. (5) for z = 0 (a),
while the transition disappears for z ≥ 2 (b).
(a) z=0
xm
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FIG. 5. Plots (a) and (b): position of the maxima of P (x) and
its different phases as a function of a/h when (a) (a/h)c > 0
and (b) (a/h)c ≤ 0. The inserts show schematically the shape
of the probability distribution P (x): bimodal for (a/h) <
(a/h)c and unimodal for (a/h) > (a/h)c. Plot (c): probability
distribution (gray scale) as a function of x (vertical axis), for
different values of a/h (horizontal axis).
B. Unbalanced case
We consider in this subsection M = 1 and z+ 6= z−, a
situation schematically represented by Fig. 6.
N − nn
z+ z−
FIG. 6. Schematic representation of the system with one com-
munity of optimistic (green–left circles) and pessimistic (red–
right circles) agents, influenced by z+ optimistic (green–left
square) and z− (red–right square) pessimistic zealots. The
different sizes of the squares indicates the different number of
opposite zealots.
Now, the dynamics of the system can be seen as that of
a noisy voter model with two effective noise coefficients,
a+u for pessimistic to optimistic transitions, and a
−
u for
the reciprocal ones, and an effective herding constant hu
(the subscript “u” refers to the unbalanced case). If the
total number of zealots is z and ∆z = z+ − z−, the new
effective noise and herding parameters can be written as
a±u = ab ±
∆z
2N
hu,
hu = hb.
(6)
with hb and ab given by Eq. (4). Hence, the symmetry
breaking induced by the zealots involves the noise con-
tribution to the dynamics, the herding being modified by
the total number of zealots z regardless their preferred
opinions. The form of the new coefficients can be inter-
preted with an agent-base analysis of the dynamics, as
we did in the balanced case.
As can be inferred from a study of a more general case
to be carried out in Sec. V, and also in a different way
in Appendix C, the system can present two new phases
(see Fig. 7). If the noise-herding ratio is smaller than the
critical value
(a/h)c =
1
2(N + z)
(
2− z +
N + 1
N − 1
|∆z|
)
, (7)
the system is in the extreme asymmetric (EA) phase
characterized by P (x) having one minimum and one
maximum at the extreme values of the magnetization
(at − sign(∆z) and sign(∆z), respectively). For a/h ≥
(a/h)c, the absolute maximum of the previous phase
6moves to intermediate values of the magnetization and a
local minimum appears at x = sign(∆z), the system be-
ing now at the asymmetric unimodal (AU) phase, where
P (x) displays a single maximum at xm 6= 0.
The critical value given by Eq. (7) becomes negative
when z > 2N+1
N−1 + |∆z| ≈ 2 + |∆z|. In this case, the sys-
tem exhibits always the AU phase, regardless the value of
a/h. As in the balanced case, then, the zealotry destroys
the preference for the consensus states favoring configura-
tions where macroscopic fractions of agents with different
opinions coexist. As we will see in Sec. IV, if zealots do
not act upon all agents, new phases will appear for small
values of a/h.
If we focus on the behavior of the maximum of the dis-
tribution, xm, it is xm = sign(∆z) in the extreme asym-
metric phase, while it changes continuously as a function
of a/h in the asymmetric unimodal phase as
xm =
N+1
N−1∆z
2(N + z) [a/h− (a/h)c] +
N+1
N−1 |∆z|
, (8)
see Appendix C. Contrary to the balanced case, now xm
changes continuously in the transition, as shown in Fig. 7.
The breaking of symmetry due to the unbalance in the
number of optimistic and pessimistic zealots transforms
the discontinuous behavior of xm into a continuous one.
IV. PARTIAL INFLUENCE
Here we generalize the study of the previous section by
allowing the zealots to directly influence only part of the
system. In the general setup introduced in Sec. II we
need to consider a system made of two communities: one
with N1 agents directly connected to the zealots and an-
other with N −N1 agents with no connections to zealots.
The main objective is to describe the behavior of the
voters as a whole allowing N1 to vary from 0 to N and
distinguishing again between balanced and unbalanced
number of optimistic and pessimistic zealots.
A. Balanced case
We consider M = 2 with z+1 = z
−
1 and z
+
2 = z
−
2 = 0,
as schematized in Fig. 8.
Numerical simulations of this case unveil a similar phe-
nomenology to that depicted in Fig. 2. The system ex-
hibits two phases separated by a critical value (a/h)c,
that now depends on the number of zealots z1 = z
+
1 +z
−
1 ,
N , and N1. For a/h ≤ (a/h)c the system is in the sym-
metric bimodal while for a/h ≥ (a/h)c the system is in
the symmetric unimodal phase. Regarding the value of
the maximum of the distribution, xm, the situation is
completely analogous to that of the one community case,
as depicted in Fig. 5.
In order to derive an expression for (a/h)c in this case
we can proceed as in the previous sections by trying to
xm
a/h(a/h)c
1
x
P
x
P
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FIG. 7. Top: position of the maxima of P (x) and its different
phases as a function of a/h when (a/h)c > 0 and ∆z > 0. The
inserts show schematically the shape of the probability distri-
bution P (x): extreme asymmetric (EA) for (a/h) < (a/h)c
and asymmetric unimodal (AU) for (a/h) > (a/h)c. Bottom:
probability distribution (gray scale) as a function of x (verti-
cal axis), for different values of a/h (horizontal axis).
N1
N − nn
z+1 z
−
1
FIG. 8. Schematic representation of the system of M = 2
communities, only one directly influenced by the same number
of optimistic and pessimistic zealots.
figure out how the dynamics of a single agent changes
7if we were to absorb the entire effect of the zealots into
global noise and herding constants, now denoted by ab
and hb. In doing so, we approximate the dynamics by
an effective one where all agents are equivalent. Con-
sider first the herding constant. Upon eliminating the
zealots, a fraction of N1/N copying processes are elim-
inated, hence h is reduced by N1z1
N(N+z1)
h. The previous
elimination produces a modification of the effective noise:
we have to add to the parameter a the contribution of
the zealots, now N1z12N(N+z1)h for each possible transition.
Hence, we have
ab ≃ a+
N1z1
2N(N + z1)
h,
hb ≃ h−
N1z1
N(N + z1)
h,
(9)
which in fact would be exact expressions if the two
communities had the same statistical properties. Ob-
serve that the new constants are a generalization of
Eqs. (4) to situations of two communities. From Eqs. 9
we can also infer the effect of zealotry on the system:
the effective noise increases with a term proportional to
N1z1/(N+z1), while the herding decreases with the same
factor.
The effective coefficients can be now used to derive the
critical expression (a/h)c, given by condition ab/hb =
1/N , since the system at this approximation has the same
phenomenology as that of the noisy voter model:
(a/h)c =
1
N
[
1−
(N + 2)z1
2N(N + z1)
N1
]
(10)
(see Sec. V for an alternative derivation based on a
master–equation study). The domain of validity of the
different phases are better visualized by considering a
phase diagram in the (a/h,N1/N) plane. In this dia-
gram, Eq. (10) gives a critical line dividing the space pa-
rameters into two disjoint, symmetric bimodal and sym-
metric unimodal, regions, as shown in Fig. 9. Without
the influence of zealots, i.e. with z1 = 0, Eq. (10) is a
horizontal line in the phase diagram, the dashed line of
the left plot of Fig. 9. Upon increasing the number of
zealots, the critical line moves toward the bottom of the
diagram, making the SB phase narrow. In other words,
for a given N1 and by increasing a/h, the system may
transient from the SB to the SU phases, at a smaller a/h
for larger z1. Eventually, the number of zealots is so high
so that if N1 ≥ N
∗
1 (z1) the only feasible phase to the
system is the SU phase, that is to say there is no value of
a/h for which the system can stay at the SB phase. The
critical value N∗1 (z1) is given by imposing (a/h)c = 0,
N∗1 (z1) =
2(N + z1)
(N + 2)z1
N, (11)
which is always larger than N∗∗1 ≡ 2N/(N + 2) ≃ 2 and
smaller than N for z1 > 2. Hence, for N1 < N
∗∗
1 the two
phases are possible, regardless the number of zealots z1,
while for N1 > N
∗∗
1 the SB phase disappears for N1 >
N∗1 (z1).
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FIG. 9. Phase diagrams with simulation (symbols) and the-
oretical (lines) results for a system with N = 200 agents and
z+1 = z
−
1 = z1/2 with z1 = 0 (dashed line), 2 (squares), 4
(circles), and 6 (triangles).
So far, we have focused on global properties of the sys-
tem, disregarding specific features of the two communi-
ties. In fact, the fundamental assumption in the deriva-
tion of Eq. (9), and hence Eqs. (10) and (11), is that of
same statistical properties of the two communities. But
this is not the case in general: if N1 is small enough,
for example, the fluctuations of the magnetization of the
first community are expected to be larger than that of the
second one, see Appendix A for a quantitative compari-
son. Moreover, there are cases close to the critical points,
where the global magnetization has a uniform probabil-
ity function (uniform phase) while the communities are
each in a different phase, see Fig. 10. Nevertheless, the
statistical differences between communities turn out to
be irrelevant for the determination of the global behavior
of the system, as the excellent agreement between theory
and simulations shown in Fig. 9 reveals.
 0.48
 0.5
 0.52
−1 −0.5  0  0.5  1
x
FIG. 10. Probability distributions of the global magnetization
(black) and partial magnetization of first community (blue)
and second community (red) for a system with N = 200,
N1 = N/2, z
+
1 = z
−
1 = 1, and a/h = (a/h)c. While the global
system is in a uniform phase (as indicated by the flatness of
the pdf), the first community is in the symmetric bimodal
phase, where the second community is in the symmetric uni-
modal phase.
B. Unbalanced case
For the unbalanced case, we consider a system with
two communities M = 2, with only one being influenced
8by optimistic and pessimistic zealots in different numbers
z+1 6= z
−
1 , as in Fig. 11.
N1
N − nn
z+1 z
−
1
FIG. 11. Schematic representation of the system of M = 2
communities, only one directly influenced by different num-
bers of optimistic and pessimistic zealots.
Following similar steps as in the balanced case, we pro-
vide first numerical simulations of the trajectories and
their corresponding probability functions for the differ-
ent phases the system may exhibit. As it is apparent
from Fig. 12, the trajectories and probabilities are asym-
metric, the opinion of the system tends to be that of
the majority of zealots. Besides the extreme asymmet-
ric and asymmetric unimodal phases already found for
the one–community case, Fig. 12 shows the existence of
a new asymmetric bimodal (AB) phase characterized by
the probability distribution having two relative maxima
at the extreme values of the magnetization, see top row
of Fig. 12. There are two critical values of a/h that
separates the three aforementioned phases: asymmetric
bimodal for (a/h) < (a/h)c,1, extreme asymmetric for
(a/h)c,1 < (a/h) < (a/h)c,2 and asymmetric unimodal
for (a/h) > (a/h)c,2. When reaching the transition point
(a/h)c,1 by increasing the value of (a/h), the smallest rel-
ative maximum of P (x) (located at the value of the mag-
netization opposite to the one preferred by the majority
of zealots) becomes a relative minimum. Analogously, the
absolute maximum at x = sign(∆z1) becomes a relative
minimum when reaching a/h < (a/h)c,2 by increasing
the value of (a/h).
By a similar reasoning to the one used in Subsec. IVA
the effective coefficients are
a±u = ab ±
N1∆z1
2N(N + z1)
h,
hu = hb,
(12)
with ab and hu given by Eq. (9). These rates are now
used to compute the critical lines according to the gen-
eral theory described in Appendix C for a one-community
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FIG. 12. Simulations results for the trajectory x(t) and proba-
bility function P (x) of a system ofN = 200 agents, N1 = N/2,
z+1 = 1, z
−
1 = 0, and z2 = 0 for the following cases (from top to
bottom in the figure) (i) a/h < (a/h)c,1; (ii) a/h = (a/h)c,1;
(iii) (a/h)c,1 < a/h < (a/h)c,2; (iv) a/h = (a/h)c,2 ; and (v)
a/h > (a/h)c,2. Time is measured in units of h
−1. The solid
lines on the last two plots of P (x) are theoretical approxima-
tions derived in Appendix B.
system:
(a/h)c,i =
1
N
[
1−
(N + 2)z1
2N(N + z1)
N1
]
+ (−1)i
(N + 1)N1
2N(N − 1)(N + z1)
|∆z1|,
(13)
for i = 1 and 2. Equation (13) coincides with (7) for
N1 = N and with Eq. (10) for ∆z1 = 0, as expected for
consistency. This approach is also consistent with the
more general one of Sec. V.
In Fig. 13 we show the region of existence of the differ-
9ent phases in the parameter space (a/h,N1/N) for some
representative situations. The phase space is divided by
the two critical lines (a/h)c,1 and (a/h)c,2 into three dis-
connected regions, corresponding to the AB (bottom),
EA (center), and AU (top) phases. In general, the posi-
tions of the two critical lines on the phase diagram de-
pend very differently on the total number of agents N
and on the number of zealots z+1 and z
−
1 . For the spe-
cific values of the right plot of Fig. 13, while the critical
line (a/h)c,1 does not change very much with ∆z1, as far
as it is small compared to N , the critical line (a/h)c.2
moves from almost a horizontal line for z1 = |∆z1| to
(a/h)c,1 for ∆z1 = 0. When the number of optimistic
and pessimistic zealots becomes equal, the two critical
lines coincide and we recover the results of the balanced
case.
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FIG. 13. Phase diagrams for a system of N = 200 agents.
Left: z+1 = 1, z
−
1 = 0. Right: z
+
1 = 5, z
−
1 = 0 (squares), 1
(up circles), . . . , 5 (pentagon).
As for the case of one community, the absolute max-
imum of the probability function changes continuously
with a/h, even at the critical point (a/h)c,2. In con-
trast, the relative maximum disappears discontinuously
at (a/h)c,1, see Fig. 14.
a/h
(a/h)c1
(a/h)c2
1
−1
xm
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
4.95×10-3 1/N 5.1×10-3
|x m
|
a/h
FIG. 14. Left: schematic representation of the maxima of the
probability function for a case of z+1 > z
−
1 . Right: numerical
(symbols) and theory (lines) results for the absolute maximum
for a system of N = 200 agents, z+1 = 1, z
−
1 = 0, and N1 =
N/200, N/20, 2, 0 (from top to bottom).
V. GENERAL CASE
After having discussed particular cases in the previ-
ous sections, we focus now on the phase diagram and its
critical lines for a general case of M communities with
different numbers of zealots affecting different communi-
ties. After a systematic numerical study, we confirm the
general unbalanced case of the previous scenarios, namely
that the system may stay in the asymmetric bimodal, ex-
treme asymmetric or asymmetric unimodal phases, that
correspond to three regions separated by the critical lines
(a/h)c,1 and (a/h)c,2, in a way analogous to the unbal-
anced case of M = 2. This is the most general situation,
since it contains the balanced ones as a limit: the EA
phase disappears, since (a/h)c,1 and (a/h)c,2 become the
same line, and AB and AU phases become SB and SU
phases, respectively. Thus, in order to unveil the struc-
ture of the phase diagram, the only thing needed is to
determine the location of the two critical lines for which
we apply here a line of reasoning based on an analysis of
the master equation.
The critical lines of the phase diagram correspond to
values of the parameters of the system where the prob-
ability P (n) exhibits some peculiarities for n = 0, N . In
general, however, P (n) does not obey an autonomous
equation, and we have to consider first the probability
of finding the system at a state S = {n1, . . . , nM}, the
function p(S) = p(n1, . . . , nM ). It obeys the following
master equation valid for steady–state conditions
M∑
k=1
[
(E+k − 1)pi
−
k (S)p(S) +(E
−
k − 1)pi
+
k (S)p(S)
]
= 0,
(14)
where we have made explicit the dependence of the rates
Eq. (1) on the state of the system, and E±i are operators
acting on an arbitrary state function f(S) as E±i f(S) =
f(n1, . . . , ni ± 1, . . . , nM ).
For n = 0, the only possible state is S = (0, . . . , 0) for
which the master equation implies
M∑
k=1
pi−k ({0, . . . , 1︸︷︷︸
k
, . . . , 0})p({0, . . . , 1︸︷︷︸
k
, . . . , 0})
=
(
M∑
k=1
pi+k ({0, . . . , 0})
)
p({0, . . . , 0}).
(15)
For the determination of the critical lines we now make
the approximation that
p({0, . . . , 1︸︷︷︸
k
, . . . , 0}) ≃
Nk
N
P (n = 1), (16)
which assumes that if there is only one optimistic agent,
the probability that he belongs to community k is pro-
portional to the population of that community (an as-
sumption trivially satisfied for M = 1). This way, since
p({0, . . . , 0}) = P (n = 0), we have
P (n = 1) ≃ N
∑M
k=1 pi
+
k ({0, . . . , 0})∑M
k=1 Nkpi
−
k ({0, . . . , 1︸︷︷︸
k
, . . . , 0})
P (n = 0).
(17)
The critical line (a/h)c,1 appears when P (n = 0) changes
from local maximum to local minimum, or P (n = 1) =
10
P (n = 0). After replacing the rates given by Eq. (1) in
Eq. (17) we obtain
(a/h)c,1 =
1
N(N − 1)
M∑
k=1
Nk
N + zk
[
z−k − 1−N(z
+
k − 1)
]
.
(18)
By symmetry considerations, the other critical line is
(a/h)c,2 =
1
N(N − 1)
M∑
k=1
Nk
N + zk
[
z+k − 1−N(z
−
k − 1)
]
.
(19)
As expected, by taking z+k = z
−
k , the critical lines coin-
cide.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have analyzed the influence of agents
that never change their state (zealots) on the global prop-
erties of the noisy voter model. Only simple situations
of all–to–all connection among voters have been consid-
ered, but still allowing different communities of agents to
be directly influenced by a different number of zealots.
In the zealots-free case, it is known that when increasing
the noise to herding ratio the noisy voter model displays
a finite-size transition from a symmetric bimodal phase
(where consensus is the norm) to a symmetric unimodal
phase with coexistence of opinions. As explained in Sec.
II, the dynamics of the voters with zealotry is equiva-
lent to that of heterogeneous (different noise and herding
constants) noisy voters without zealots. This equivalence
between models allows a straightforward explanation of
how zealotry acts on the system for some simple cases.
In the case of a balanced number of optimistic and pes-
simistic zealots with global influence (where zealots act
upon all agents), it turns out that the consensus (sym-
metric bimodal, SB) phase disappears and the system is
always in the symmetric unimodal (SU) phase. This re-
sult shows the dramatic influence of the zealots, even for
their lowest possible number (z = 2). If the balanced
number of zealots influence only a fraction N1/N of the
total population, then the symmetric bimodal phase can
still be present as far as the fractionN1/N is smaller than
some critical value as given by Eq. (11) and summarized
in Fig. 9 for a particular case. Similar results have been
found on a kinetic model of opinion dynamics [49].
In the unbalanced scenario where unequal numbers
of optimistic and pessimistic zealots influence the whole
population, the main result is the appearance of asym-
metric phases which tilt the distribution of opinions to-
wards the one favored by the majority of zealots. Increas-
ing the noise to herding ratio the model displays a tran-
sition from an extreme asymmetric (EA) phase (where
the maximum of the probability distribution occurs at
the consensus value favored by the zealots) to an asym-
metric unimodal (AU) phase where the maximum, being
still tilted towards the zealot-favored opinion, is located
far from the extreme consensus opinion, indicating again
a strong qualitative influence of the zealots on the sys-
tem. The extreme asymmetric phase does not exist for a
sufficiently large population of zealots, i.e. z > 2 + |∆z|,
being ∆z the difference between the number of zealots of
each type. If the unbalanced number of zealots acts only
upon a sufficiently small fraction of the populationN1/N ,
then a new, asymmetric bimodal (AB), phase can appear.
This phase is characterized by a probability distribution
showing relative maxima at both consensus states.
In the general case of several communities, k =
1, . . . ,M , and sets of zealots acting on a particular com-
munity, the phenomenology is similar to the one de-
scribed above. If all communities suffer the influence of
a balanced number of zealots z+k = z
−
k , ∀k, then the pos-
sible outcomes are the symmetric bimodal (SB) or uni-
modal (SU) phases, depending on the particular value
of the noise to herding ratio, as determined by Eq. (18).
This is also the situation when the optimistic–pessimistic
balance is conserved, for instance if N1 = N2 = N/2,
and z+1 = z
−
2 and z
−
1 = z
+
2 . In other cases, three asym-
metric phases (extreme EA, unimodal UA or bimodal
BA) can be present in a region of the parameter space
as defined by the two lines (a/h)c,1 and (a/h)c,2 given
by Eqs. (18,19), as shown in Fig. 13 in a particular case.
Again, not all the phases are compatible with all possible
numbers of zealots and of their links.
It is also interesting to analyze the results of the present
work in terms of the competition between zealots of dif-
ferent opinions willing to have the largest possible num-
ber of agents in the same state as the zealot. It is clear
that the best situation for the zealot is to break the sym-
metry of the problem going to the EA phase, but if the
symmetry cannot be broken, the best strategy is rather
counterintuitive: In this case the best situation for each
zealot is the bimodal phase in which most of the popula-
tion coincides with the state of one zealot for long periods
of time. To achieve this result, the strategy of the zealot
is to interact with a small number of agents (N1 < N
∗
1 ,
Eq. (11)) to make sure that for a low enough value of
the ratio of the noise to herding parameters, the system
remains in the bimodal phase (Fig. 9). The reason for
that can be understood in our mapping of zealots into
a heterogeneous noisy voter model: the action of zealots
plays the role of an effective noise that tends to bring the
system into the unimodal phase.
In conclusion, we have shown that, in general, upon
introducing zealots in an homogeneous population of
(noisy) voters, the dynamics of the system changes dras-
tically: a breaking of symmetry can be induced, and new
phases describing the global behavior of the system may
appear. Although the aforementioned results have been
obtained at the mean–field level, where all–to–all links
connect all voters, we expect a similar phenomenology for
more realistic, high dimensional networks, which are the
most representative in social systems. A detailed analy-
sis on the impact of the network dimension and topology
remains an open question.
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Appendix A: Closed system of equations for the
moments
Consider the master equation for the probability func-
tion P (S) with the general rates in (1) or (2) written
as
dP (S)
dt
= J [P ], (A1)
where J [P ] stands for the l.h.s of Eq. (14). The mean
values of a generic quantity nc11 n
c2
2 . . . n
cM
M , for given in-
teger values c1, . . . , cM , can be obtained by multiplying
Eq. (A1) by the same quantity and summing over all
possible states:
d
dt
〈nc11 n
c2
2 . . . n
cM
M 〉 =
∑
〈S〉
nc11 n
c2
2 . . . n
cM
M J [P, S]. (A2)
Taking into account the fact that P vanishes for non-
physical values of S and the explicit form of the rates, it
is not difficult to have the following general property∑
〈S〉
f(n1, . . . , nM )E
±
k [pi
∓
k (S)P (S)]
=
∑
〈S〉
pi∓k (S)P (S)E
∓
k f(n1, . . . , nM )
(A3)
for any function f . The latter expression allows us to
write Eq. (A2) as
d
dt
〈nc11 n
c2
2 . . . n
cM
M 〉 =
M∑
k=1
〈[
pi+k (E
+
k − 1) + pi
−
k (E
−
k − 1)
]
nc11 n
c2
2 . . . n
cM
M
〉
.
(A4)
It turns out that the r.h.s. of Eq. (A4) is a polynomial
of degree c1 + · · ·+ cM . This is because[
pi+k (E
+
k − 1) + pi
−
k (E
−
k − 1)
]
nckk
= ck(pi
+
k − pi
−
k )n
ck−1
k +O(n
ck−1
k )
(A5)
is of degree ck, since pi
+
k − pi
−
k is of degree one, as it is
apparent from Eq. (1).
The latter property makes the system of equations for
the moments of degree D to depend only on those of
degree less or equal to D and then lead to a complicated
but close set of equations for the moments that can be
solved exactly and analytically. As a direct application,
we show in Fig. 15 that the first moments of the global
and partial magnetizations for the different components
of the community are in general different.
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FIG. 15. Steady–state values of the first moments of the
magnetization x for a system with two communities M = 2,
N = 200 agents. Right column, unbalanced case: z2 = 0,
z+1 = 1, z
−
1 = 0. Left column, balanced case z2 = 0,
z+1 = z
−
1 = 1 . Different symbols (simulations) and lines
(theory) inside each plot correspond to N1 = 10 (squares),
100 (circles), and 190 (triangles).
Appendix B: Reconstruction of a (discrete)
probability distribution from its moments
Let P (x) be any probability distribution defined at the
discrete set of points {xi = 2
i
N
− 1; i = 0, 1, . . . , N}, and
let F be the Hilbert space of normalizable functions f(x)
defined in that same set with the scalar product 〈f, g〉 =∑N
i=0 f(xi)g(xi). P (x) can be expanded in any basis of
F . Amongst all possible basis we choose the orthonormal
set of discrete Chebyshev polynomials {CNj (x)}
N
j=0 [44–
46]:
CNj (x) =
1√(
N+j+1
2j+1
)(
2j
j
) j∑
s=0
(−1)s+j
×
(
s+ j
s
)(
N − s
N − j
)(
N
2 (1 + x)
s
)
,
(B1)
(CNj (x) is of degree j). This basis is obtained from the
basis of monomials {xj}Nj=0 by the Gram-Schmidt or-
thonormalization procedure. When N tends to infinity,
F tends to the space of square integrable functions in
[−1, 1] and CNj (x) to the Legendre polynomials [46]. The
expansion reads:
P (x) =
N∑
j=0
qjC
N
j (x), (B2)
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where qj are coefficients to be determined. The advan-
tage of using the base of discrete Chebyshev polyno-
mials is that the coefficients qj can be easily obtained
from the orthonormality condition
〈
CNj C
N
j′
〉
= δj,j′ as
qj =
〈
CNj , P
〉
=
∑
i P (xi)C
N
j (xi), which is nothing but
the average value
〈
CNj (x)
〉
with respect to the probability
P (x). This way, we reconstruct P (x) from its moments,
a simple way of solving the so–called moment problem
[47, 48] for the present case.
In practice, for large N , we can approximate P (x) as
P (x) ≈
K∑
j=0
〈
CNj (x)
〉
CNj (x), (B3)
and express P (x) from the knowledge of the fist moments〈
xk
〉
, k = 1, . . . ,K of the probability distribution. The
approximation turns out to be good if the probability
function is not close to zero. Otherwise, the approxima-
tion might not respect the important condition P (x) ≥ 0.
Equation (B2) is particularly useful with rates at
Eq. (1) of the general noisy voter model with zealots,
since we can analytically compute the moments
〈
nj
〉
(and〈
xj
〉
) in the steady state, as we showed in Appendix A.
Appendix C: Alternative derivation of the critical
lines
Consider one single community M = 1 and general
rates pi±(n). From the master equation for the steady
probability function P (n) of the system, it is easily in-
ferred the following useful relation
P (n) =
pi+(n− 1)
pi−(n)
P (n− 1), (C1)
for 1 ≤ n ≤ N . This equation, together with the normal-
ization condition for P (n), provides a closed form for P
in terms of the rates
P (n) =
∏n
k=1
pi+(n−k)
pi−(n+1−k)
1 +
∑N
l=1
∏l
k=1
pi+(l−k)
pi−(l+1−k)
. (C2)
Moreover, we can identify the local maximum (minimum)
of P (n), and hence infer the shape of P (n), as those
values nm that satisfy
P (nm − 1) ≤ (≥)P (nm) ≥ (≤)P (nm + 1). (C3)
Expression (C1) proves that the only possible way P (n)
can have more than one extreme is the rates to be non-
linear functions of n (the condition is not sufficient). If
the rates are linear, then P (n) has one extreme at most.
If Eqs. (C1) and (C3) are used with general rates of
the form (2), for the one–community case M = 1, the
extreme of P (x) reads
xm =
N + 1
N
a+1 − a
−
1
a+1 + a
−
1 −
2h1
N
, (C4)
where xm = 2nm/N − 1.
Now we particularize Eq. (C4) for the rates of the noisy
voter model with global influence of zealots, using Eq. (2)
with k = 1 for the coefficients. This shows that xm = 0
if z+ = z− (balanced case), and provides Eq. (8) for
the unbalanced case. Furthermore, from Eq. (C4) we
also determine the critical value (a/h)c separating EA
and AU phases by imposing xm = ±1. The resulting
expression for (a/h)c coincides with Eq. (7), which by
the way also provides the critical value for the balanced
case. Moreover, for the balanced case, it can be explicitly
seen, by imposing Eq. (C3) for all nc ∈ {2, . . . , N}, that
the uniform solution occurs only when a/h = (a/h)c,
with (a/h)c given by Eq. (7).
The same procedure can be followed by now using
Eq. (C4) with the effective coefficients obtained in Sec.
IV, namely Eqs. (9) and (12). That way we derive Eqs.
(10) and (13) for the critical lines.
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